In recent years, the work of international economic organisations like the World Trade Organization ('WTO') has come under increasing attack from nongovernmental organisations ('NGOs'). Much of this concern has focused on the perceived impact of trade and investment agreements on issues as diverse as the environment, labour standards and human rights. NGO demands for increased involvement in the work of these organisations have reaped some dividends. For example, NGOs have increasingly sought and attained limited rights to submit amicus curiae briefs within the dispute settlement process of the WTO 1 and Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 2 However, most member states have stringently opposed the involvement of NGOs in the legislative or policy processes of international economic organisations. A fundamental tenet of this opposition is the idea that NGOs, unlike national governments, are not sufficiently representative of the broader public in member states to justify their involvement in trade and investment negotiations. At the same time, proponents of greater NGO involvement counter this opposition under the general rubric of legitimacy. They point out that the case for inclusion is not based on whether NGOs are representative but on their ability to enhance the quality of the decision-making process by acting as 'intellectual competitors' or 'policy entrepreneurs'. 3 A related argument is that NGOs may be able to act as a form of 'connective tissue' between organisations like the WTO broader public. 4 This ability to assist in the conferral of legitimacy is seen as increasingly important as liberalisation efforts move beyond a focus on tariffs (and their easily quantifiable benefits) to the more difficult and controversial task of removing discriminatory, behind-the-border regulatory measures. However, what is largely missing in the debate amongst international lawyers is an analysis of the impact of the Internet on these questions. 5 On occasion the impact of the Internet is hinted at but there is little substantive analysis. 6 At most, some commentators argue that the Internet may broaden participatory opportunities for developing country NGOs. 7 This article offers a contribution to the gap in the analysis. The subject of the article is the way in which the Internet affects the advocacy efforts of NGOs, and given this, the ability of economic organisations like the WTO to continue to oppose greater NGO involvement in legislative and policy processes. The underlying research question is to what extent the Internet has pushed the debate in either direction.
The methodology that will be used is that of a case study of the failed negotiations among the member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ('OECD') from 1995 to 1998 towards the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ('MAI'). The case study has been chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the OECD approach in the MAI negotiations was a traditionally statist one with relatively low levels of transparency and few participatory opportunities for NGOs. Secondly, the very active (and to some extent successful) campaign by NGOs against the MAI relied heavily on the Internet. Thus the MAI case study offers a useful prism through which to consider the impact of the Internet on NGOs and the future utility of a largely statist approach to trade and investment negotiations. The relevance of the MAI case study is further heightened by the inclusion of investment rules on the negotiating agenda to come out of the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference in November 2001. 8 Moreover, negotiations towards a regional investment 4 Esty, 'Linkages and Governance', above n 3, 725-6. 5 In other disciplines, such as the social sciences, the role of the Internet in enabling NGOs to network across national borders has generated a variety of perspectives among scholars. See initiative within the Free Trade Area of the Americas are currently on foot, with particular emphasis on transparency and opportunities for NGO participation. 9 The article will be organised as follows. Part II offers some background material. It charts some of the main themes underlying the debate on whether to provide NGOs with opportunities to participate in trade and investment negotiations. This section also examines at a conceptual level the impact of the Internet on NGOs and on this debate. Part III then describes the MAI episode. It is necessary to do so in some detail as several of the NGO concerns about the MAI focused on its problematic similarities with the provisions of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Part IV examines the NGO campaign against the MAI, the use of the Internet and the OECD response. Part V offers some suggestions and conclusions.
II BACKGROUND TO THE MAI CASE STUDY A

Overview of Debate
Scholarly debate on the question of NGO involvement in trade and investment negotiations is voluminous. 10 The focus of this article will be primarily on the MAI case study. As a starting point, however, it is important to distil the key themes surrounding the existing debate before attempting to discern lessons from the MAI case study.
The primary argument put forward for limiting greater engagement with NGOs in negotiations is the idea that, unlike national governments, NGOs are not sufficiently representative of the broader public. A single-issue NGO is unlikely to engage in the complicated balancing of public (and sometimes opposing) interests expected of representatives of democratically elected national 9 The Free Trade Area of the Americas ('FTAA') is a draft agreement to liberalise trade, investment and other restrictions currently being negotiated amongst 34 states in the Americas. Negotiations towards the FTAA formally commenced in 1998. governments. 11 As a related issue, opponents point to the developed country origin and bias of most NGOs. 12 Opponents of greater engagement also use a narrower argument based on the inter-governmental structure of organisations like the WTO. This is linked to the idea that there is a separation of areas of influence between the national and international levels. This perspective does not deny NGOs the right to influence decision-making, but argues that it should be done solely at the national level. 13 Aside from issues of representation, there is the difficult problem of accountability. To whom are NGOs really accountable? What is there to stop NGOs putting forward a deliberately obstructive (and unsubstantiated) critique of a proposed negotiation? This issue centres partly on the transparency of the internal structures of NGOs and especially on whether there is some form of democratic decision-making process to enable members to elect (and remove) leaders within an NGO.
These substantive problems of representation and accountability are also supplemented by more instrumental reasons for limiting greater engagement with NGOs. Secrecy in negotiations (and exclusion of NGOs) is often justified by the need to reach consensus between the negotiating partners. 14 Further, it is suggested that opening the process to NGOs would lead to a floodgates problem with negotiations being swamped by NGO demands. On these two significant objections, there does seem to be an unstated tendency to equate greater NGO involvement with direct participation in negotiations. This is not, of course, the only option. There is an entire spectrum of ways to increase NGO access to 11 However, the contrary argument is often put forward that NGOs in fact act as alternative, even preferable, identity references for citizens on specific issues. This is linked to the idea that, with the Internet, it is increasingly possible for people to choose multiple identity references that go beyond the geographical political jurisdiction in which they live. In this respect, an NGO may be a more accurate reflection of an individual's personal views than the organs of authority in his or her state. For example, an Australian citizen who cares deeply about debt relief for heavily indebted countries may see their interests better represented by a specific interest international NGO than by the Australian Government, which has many goals that must simultaneously be pursued. Against these objections, proponents of further NGO involvement essentially rely on two arguments. First, they focus on the increased NGO participation believed to flow from the ability of NGOs to act as 'intellectual competitors' or 'policy entrepreneurs'. 16 This point is grounded in the expertise NGOs may have in their chosen subject area. Secondly, proponents use a powerful legitimacy argument to justify greater NGO access to policy making. For most of its history, the legitimacy of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 17 rested on its effectiveness in delivering gains through trade liberalisation (and especially tariff reduction). However, since the end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1994, the work of the newly created WTO has moved beyond tariff liberalisation to encompass rules on such diverse issues as services, intellectual property, and investment. WTO rules on these areas potentially conflict with a host of domestic regulatory measures that may incidentally act in a discriminatory manner but are often passed for legitimate public policy reasons. Increasingly, public support will be needed to justify encroachment into these sensitive, behind-the-border regulatory measures. Recognising that NGOs can act as a 'connective tissue' with the broader public, greater NGO involvement in negotiations is seen as a way of strengthening public support for, and hence the legitimacy of, the work of bodies like the WTO. 18 This necessarily brief overview highlights the key arguments raised on either side of the debate. The next section will examine, on a conceptual level, the impact of the Internet on some of the points raised for and against greater NGO involvement in trade and investment negotiations. It will do so firstly by examining the background and key features of the Internet that are pertinent to NGO advocacy efforts.
B
The Impact of the Internet on NGOs: Some Conceptual Thoughts communications system invulnerable to nuclear attack. 19 The basic idea was to develop a communications network independent of any central control so that message data would find its own route along the network and be capable of reassembly at any point within the network. 22 the Internet has dramatically increased public expectations of transparency. Citizens of developed countries now expect to a large degree to find information on any topic on the Internet. The Internet 'is making the market for ideas contestable'. 23 Consequently, it is becoming more difficult for negotiators to limit the public release of information on the grounds that secrecy is necessary to achieve consensus in negotiations. This has particularly empowered those NGOs who have often used increased expectations of transparency as fundamental bases of their advocacy campaigns. 24 The Internet also clearly expands the areas of influence of advocacy NGOs. [Vol 3 facsimile or even transport to effect personal meetings) that are relatively expensive. In contrast, the Internet now enables these types of NGOs to network electronically across national borders through email, bulletin board systems and sites on the World Wide Web. This capacity to network may possibly enhance the ability of NGOs to act as intellectual competitors to intergovernmental bodies by sharing information and analyses. It also clearly reduces the prospect (and thereby cost) of duplication of activities between different NGOs. Aside from its organisational features, the Internet also increases the ability of NGOs to interface with and possibly influence the public. The Internet enables NGOs to disseminate information to the broader public quickly and at little or no cost. Again, prior to the Internet, NGOs relied on old media forms of communication to convey their message. Whether this be radio, television or the print media, the cost of access has previously acted as a barrier to some NGO activity. In contrast, the interwoven nature of the World Wide Web provides an exceptionally effective dissemination process. Whatever strikes a chord is picked up and repeated through networks of NGOs sharing a common goal.
However, it is difficult to see how the Internet overcomes some of the resistance to greater NGO involvement, especially that based on concerns of accountability and developed country bias. A key feature of the Internet is that it remains technologically open, enabling widespread public access without any real governmental or commercial restriction. For NGOs, this means that their message can be conveyed without fear of censorship or other forms of governmental control. However, as it is largely unregulated, anything can appear on the Internet, from conspiracy theories or rumours to outright lies. NGOs are not necessarily forced to prove the accuracy and substance of their claims on websites that they set up and control. This is in contrast to their ability to access older, mainstream information systems such as print, radio or television media. Dissemination of information or an argument through these forms of media would normally be restricted on two grounds: first, on cost, and secondly, on the fact that access to older forms of information systems are generally subject to the approval of an editorial gatekeeper. The problems of the so-called digital divide are also clear. Rates of penetration of Internet access skew the use of this important tool in favour of developed country organisations. 25 Thus the Internet would seem on first principles to enhance some advantages of increased NGO cooperation put forward by proponents of greater access to NGO participation, whilst exacerbating some of the fears of opponents. The underlying research question then moves to the quantitative effect of the use of the Internet by NGOs and the extent to which that use pushes the debate in either direction. The next parts of the article will attempt to quantify this impact by examining the case study of the NGO campaign against the MAI.
III THE MAI EPISODE A Overview
In 1991 the OECD commenced work on the idea of a multilateral agreement on investment. 26 The decision to study the possibility of such an agreement was driven by three factors: rapid growth in investment flows by the early 1990s, the trend towards unilateral liberalisation of national restrictions on foreign investment, and the absence of a comprehensive investment agreement at the international level. 27 The results of the technical analysis were presented as a report to the OECD Council of Ministers in May 1995. 28 The report concluded that 'the foundations have now been laid for the successful negotiation of [a MAI] building on OECD's existing instruments and expertise'. 29 Based on this report, the OECD Council agreed to commence negotiations towards a MAI with the mandate that the agreement was to:
• provide for a broad multilateral agreement for international investment with high standards for the liberalization of investment regimes and investment protection with effective dispute settlement procedures; • be a free-standing international treaty open to all OECD Members and the European Communities and to accession by non-OECD Member countries, which will be consulted as negotiations progress. 30 The first part of the mandate highlights the relatively limited scope of the MAI exercise. It was primarily designed to build upon existing OECD instruments to set 'high standards' on established norms of investment liberalisation and protection backed up by an effective process of dispute settlement. 31 The conception of the MAI was thus of an agreement which would strengthen and multilateralise existing disciplines in bilateral investment treaties 32 as well as regional investment agreements such as Chapter 11 of NAFTA. 27 For a discussion of each of these factors, see CIME/CMIT Report, above n 26, ch 1. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid intro. 30 Ibid ch 3. 31 Ibid ch 2. 32 Since the late 1960s, bilateral investment treaties ('BITs') have become primary instruments for reaching agreement on foreign investment between developed and developing countries. Yet within the mandate there is no reference to any involvement of or consultation with NGOs. 33 This exclusion may, in part, have been linked to the choice of the OECD as the forum for the MAI negotiations. Unlike the WTO, the OECD has a relatively limited membership base principally comprising developed states. 34 The United States was strongly in favour of having the OECD as the forum for the MAI negotiations. 35 The basis for the US preference for the OECD appears to be linked to the relatively modest results on investment from the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO negotiations, which were often attributed to the recalcitrance of developing states. 36 The MAI was intended to avoid this problem by negotiating strong, comprehensive rules amongst supposedly like-minded countries. 37 If developing countries were to be excluded from negotiations due to the concern that their demands would dilute the MAI commitments, it is not surprising that there was no role planned for NGOs in the negotiation process.
OECD, A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Report by the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and the Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT)
Aside from neglecting the question of some form of NGO participation, there was also no reference to the role of transparency in the upcoming negotiations or 33 The only reference to NGOs in the mandate was: 'The business community and labour, represented by BIAC and TUAC, strongly support a MAI which sets high standards and a balanced and equitable framework for dealing with investment issues': OECD, CIME/CMIT Report, above n 26, ch 1. The Business Industry Advisory Council ('BIAC') and the Trade Union Advisory Council ('TUAC') are two NGOs that have close historical links to the OECD and who have been granted consultative status with the OECD. Their role in the MAI negotiations will be examined further in Part IV(D)(2)(b) of this article. 34 During the negotiations towards the MAI from 1995 to 1998, there were 29 member states of the OECD. These were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the US. The OECD also identified certain countries as likely candidates for accession and invited them to sit in as observers at the negotiations in 1997 and 1998. These were initially Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, China and the Slovak Republic. Three Baltic countries -Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -were also later invited to join as observers: OECD, Multilateral Agreement the need to publicise the benefits that would flow from such a liberal initiative. 38 There seems to have been an expectation that the broader public would simply share the assumption of the negotiators as to the benefits of investment liberalisation. 39 This proved to be a critical mistake. Economic liberalism is subject to a chronic weakness; there are few, if any, countries in which there is a well supported political party or movement that makes classic liberalism its central body of doctrine. 40 Despite the fact that the aim of liberal policies is to enhance the public interest, the advocacy of those policies is normally an unpopular one. 41 Indeed, in their campaign against the MAI, NGOs based much of their opposition on unsupported claims that revolved around an anxiety about economic globalisation and contested the benefits that flow from foreign investment into a host state. 42 The view of the MAI at its inception as a somewhat technical exercise of building upon existing norms is also reflected in the time frame allocated for the conclusion of negotiations. The report set an objective of two years for the conclusion of negotiations in time for the meeting of the OECD Council of Ministers in 1997. 43 This two-year time frame proved overly ambitious. 44 Two problem areas soon arose.
The first was internal, as the political commitment of the OECD member states to the liberalisation commitments within the MAI began to erode. Ongoing disputes between the US, Canada and the European Union began to shadow negotiations. The MAI negotiators found it impossible to resolve three particular issues: the extraterritorial impact of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 46 and the EU proposal for an exemption for regional economic organisations. 47 The second problem is the subject of this case study: the onset of an aggressive campaign by NGOs opposing the MAI in early 1997. A striking feature of the structure of this campaign was the use of the Internet to coordinate and link up a vast array of NGOs opposed to the MAI. As indicated earlier, many NGOs opposed the MAI as the latest embodiment of the contested process of economic globalisation. But they also attacked the MAI by way of a more substantive critique of the problematic similarities between its provisions and the NAFTA Chapter 11 model.
These difficulties caused the negotiations to outrun the original two-year completion date. At the OECD Ministerial Council meeting in May 1997, the Ministers agreed to extend the completion date of negotiations to the May 1998 Ministerial Meeting. Critically, this decision provided NGOs opposing the MAI time in which to organise their campaign against the agreement. Furthermore, by 1998, the political climate that led the OECD to commence MAI negotiations had changed dramatically. By that year, the world witnessed in South East Asia 'the strongest financial panic since the Great Depression'. 48 The currency crisis 45 
USC § 6021 (2000) ('Helms Burton Act'). In the middle of the MAI negotiations in
March 1996, the Helms Burton Act entered into law in the US. Title III of the Helms Burton Act allows US citizens and corporations whose property was expropriated by the Cuban Government any time after 1 January 1959 to sue for damages against anyone who 'traffics' in their former property after 1 November 1996. Title IV prohibits entry into the US by persons who 'traffic' in confiscated property after 12 March 1996. The Helms Burton Act led to a fierce policy conflict between the US, Canada and the EU in the middle of the MAI negotiations. The underlying problem was that the Helms Burton Act potentially operated both extraterritorially and in a discriminatory manner against foreign investors from non-US states operating in Cuba. After the filing of a complaint by the EU against the US in the WTO, an understanding was eventually reached on this issue between the US and EU in May 1998 (which also envisaged amendments to the MAI negotiating text affecting the Thai baht in July 1997 led to a dramatic drop in loan finance and portfolio investment going into Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and to some extent the Philippines over the course of 1998. 49 Comparatively, flows of foreign direct investment ('FDI'), which is usually longer-term and marked by some degree of control over the foreign enterprise, proved to be relatively stable. 50 In September 1998 Malaysia imposed controls on some capital outflows in response to the crisis. 51 Two weeks prior to the Malaysian announcement, Russia had not only imposed controls on capital outflows but had also defaulted on its loan obligations by announcing a 90-day moratorium. 52 Against these dramatic changes in the global economy, the prospects for the MAI as a treaty that aimed to liberalise all forms of capital flow looked less certain. 53 Contrary to past practice, the MAI became the single focus for discussion at the April 1998 OECD Ministerial Meeting. 54 Ministers reaffirmed 'the importance they [attached] to achieving a comprehensive multilateral framework for investment' but went on to announce 'a period of assessment and further consultation between the negotiating parties and with interested parts of their societies' in preparation for the next meeting of the negotiators in October 1998. 55 However, by that time the NGO campaign had succeeded in raising public opposition to the MAI. Five prominent member states of the OECD had instituted parliamentary reviews of the MAI. 56 The review commissioned by the French Government was highly critical of both the negotiation procedure and provisions of the MAI. 57 This report, coupled with a strong concern as to the treatment of cultural industries under the MAI, led to France's withdrawal from negotiations on 14 October 1998 (one week before the MAI negotiations were set to resume). The French withdrawal signalled the death knell for the 49 agreement. Less than two months later, the OECD announced that negotiations would cease with no final agreement to result. 58 
B
The MAI Provisions
Much of the criticisms levelled by NGOs on the Internet against the MAI focused on problematic similarities between the MAI provisions and Chapter 11 of NAFTA. To test the accuracy of these claims (and, by extension, the ability of NGOs to act as intellectual competitors of negotiating fora) it is first necessary to understand the scope and operation of the MAI provisions.
Various draft texts of the MAI were produced between 1997 and 1998. 59 This part of the analysis is based on the last version of the agreement that was produced on 24 April 1998 and released by the OECD on the Internet. 60 The draft contains 12 chapters and encompasses 145 pages. Despite its length, the majority of clauses in the draft text deal with recognised disciplines in investment liberalisation, investment protection and dispute settlement. 61 The MAI negotiators referred to these disciplines as the 'three key areas of foreign direct investment rule-making'. 62 This is not surprising given that the mandate of the MAI exercise was to deliver an agreement with 'high standards' in those areas. 63 The MAI negotiators did go beyond these core issues to consider disciplines in what they termed 'new matters'. 64 However, these new matters were, at least initially, further disciplines of interest to foreign investors, including: prohibitions or limits on performance requirements; 65 the ability to transfer freely both profit and capital out of the host state; 66 and rights of access and residence for key foreign personnel. 67 In the early part of negotiations, broader considerations of the impact of these disciplines on regulatory autonomy, or indeed questions of international regulatory constraints on investors, were not a central concern of the MAI negotiators. 68 This limited approach changed late in the negotiations in March 1998. After sustained pressure from NGOs, and despite a largely exclusionary approach to the role of NGOs in the MAI negotiations, the Chairperson of the MAI Negotiating Group put forward a comprehensive package of proposals concerning environmental and labour provisions. 69 The Chairperson's package is notable as the MAI is arguably the first ever multilateral commercial agreement to amend directly its provisions to take into account NGO concerns.
Before examining the structure and substantive correctness of the NGO campaign, the next part of the article will examine the key components of the MAI on the scope of application, investment liberalisation, investment protection and dispute settlement. Within these core disciplines, the MAI provisions represented almost a facsimile (albeit strengthened in some respects) of the NAFTA Chapter 11 model. shares, stocks or other forms of equity participation in an enterprise, and rights derived therefrom; (iii) bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debt, and rights derived therefrom; (iv) rights under contracts, including turnkey, construction, management, production or revenue-sharing contracts; (v) claims to money and claims to performance; (vi) intellectual property rights; (vii) rights conferred pursuant to law or contract such as concessions, licenses, authorisations, and permits; (viii) any other tangible and intangible, movable and immovable property, and any related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens and pledges. OECD, MAI Negotiating Text, above n 46, 11. Investment Liberalisation This broad approach is also evident in the investment liberalisation provisions. Like NAFTA, the MAI aimed to liberalise national restrictions imposed on investors by requiring member states not to discriminate between foreign and domestic investors. 71 Again, like NAFTA, the MAI applied the nondiscriminatory standards of national and MFN treatment to both the pre-and post-admission phases of the investment process. 72 Depending on exceptions lodged by contracting parties, extending the obligation of non-discrimination to the pre-admission phase of the investment process would provide investors with the right of entry into the host state. In comparison, most bilateral investment treaties, with the exception of those concluded by the US and Canada, do not provide foreign investors with rights of entry. 73 In other words, they preserve the ability of host states to regulate the entry of foreign investors, an issue that is often grounded in sensitive political rather than economic reasons. 74 The incursion of the MAI model into these sovereignty-based grounds for excluding entry of foreign investors was also magnified by the way in which the agreement effected liberalisation commitments. Like NAFTA, the MAI adopted a top down model of liberalisation; the starting point was the rights set out in the agreement which ostensibly applied to all economic sectors and laws of the host state unless exempted in the agreement by the contracting party. Aside from general exceptions that applied to all or most of the MAI, 75 member states could also lodge country-specific exceptions to carve out particular discriminatory legislation from the operation of the MAI. 76 In contrast, the approach taken in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services is a bottom up approach, 71 OECD, MAI Negotiating Text, above n 46, 13. 72 Ibid. The references to 'establishment' and 'acquisition' in the national treatment and MFN treatment clauses indicate that these provisions were intended to extend to both pre-and post-admission of foreign investment. 73 whereby contracting parties have the discretion to nominate and open specific sectors when they feel ready to do so. 77 The top down structure of the MAI was particularly problematic in terms of the rights of entry provided under the agreement. Given the often sensitive political grounds for restricting entry, the top down approach forces contracting parties to be overly cautious and lodge extensive exceptions to the proposed agreement. Indeed, in early 1997 the Chairperson of the MAI Negotiating Group proposed that member states table their proposed exceptions prior to completion of the Agreement. The purpose of this was to reach the highest level of liberalisation at the outset by negotiating away proposed country-specific exceptions. Negotiators took the view that: these [country-specific] reservations will be the essential measuring rod against which can be judged the value of the rights and obligations of the MAI and, in large measure, determine the readiness of countries to adhere to the MAI. 78 However, the Chairperson's proposal led to a surprisingly high number of exceptions amongst supposedly liberal, like-minded states. 79 3
Investment Protection
Chapter IV of the MAI sets out the investment protection provisions of the draft MAI. Like NAFTA, the MAI contains strong provisions requiring host states to compensate investors in the event of expropriation of their investment. 80 These provisions cover direct as well as indirect expropriations, with the latter covering governmental measures 'having equivalent effect' to a direct expropriation. 81 But the MAI provisions replicate the drafting flaw in article 1110 of NAFTA. There is no guidance within the MAI provisions as to whether normal regulatory changes that negatively affect the value of an investment would be covered within the concept of an indirect expropriation. Similarly, the investment protection provisions duplicated NAFTA article 1105 by requiring member states to provide 'fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security' while ensuring a minimum standard of treatment of 'that required by international law'. 82 Within NAFTA, these broad and undefined obligations have led to an explosion of arbitral cases brought by investors challenging seemingly normal regulatory measures as breaching the Chapter 11 investment protection 77 81 Ibid 57. 82 Ibid 57.
guarantees. 83 Indeed, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission recently issued an interpretation on these provisions in an attempt to limit the influx of arbitral cases. 84 But the MAI negotiators simply assumed that this broad formulation would be accepted, noting that the draft [of the provisions on expropriation] has many similarities with wellknown investment protection provisions found in hundreds of bilateral investment protection agreements. This is no surprise because it was never the intention of the negotiating partners to 're-invent the wheel', but rather to add some more spokes in order to strengthen the whole vehicle. 85 This unwillingness to assess critically the broad NAFTA approach to investment protection is symptomatic of the approach of the negotiators, at least initially, to the MAI exercise generally.
4
Dispute Settlement
Like NAFTA, the MAI contains both state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures. 86 Again, there appears to have been little analysis by the MAI negotiators of the difficulties that had been encountered under Chapter 11 of NAFTA in the use by investors of these procedures to challenge regulatory measures as contrary to the NAFTA investment protection provisions. This is not altogether surprising as, with the exception of the settled action 83 There is no central repository of documents submitted in NAFTA ch 11 cases. For ch 11 cases involving Canada, the website of the brought by Ethyl Corporation against Canada, 87 most of the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases postdate the end of MAI negotiations. But it is notable that some of the OECD countries objected to the extension of the investor-state dispute resolution procedure to the pre-establishment phase of the investment process. There was some concern about giving potential investors standing to file a claim against a host state in which they were planning to invest. 88 The next part of the article will turn to the NGO campaign against the MAI. It will examine that campaign in three parts. First, the article will consider the way in which NGOs used the Internet to organise their campaign against the MAI. Secondly, the article will assess the substantive correctness of NGO claims about the MAI posted on the Internet. Thirdly, the article will consider the OECD response and outcomes of the NGO campaign.
IV THE NGO 'STOP MAI' CAMPAIGN
A
Overview and Typology
The onset of the NGO campaign against the MAI can be traced to February 1997 when a draft of the MAI was leaked to Public Citizen, a US NGO founded by consumer advocate Ralph Nader. 89 Public Citizen immediately published the draft negotiating text on the Internet. 90 Up to that point, MAI negotiations had largely been conducted in secrecy between representatives of the OECD's 29 member states. After the release of the text on the Internet, what had previously been a confidential working document became 'available to anyone with a computer and a modem.' 91 The release of the negotiating text on the Internet led to an explosion of concern amongst a bewildering range of NGOs. An estimated 600 NGOs in nearly 70 countries were involved in the MAI campaign. 92 Environmental groups were particularly prominent in opposing the draft treaty. Friends of the Earth, an international environmental NGO with offices in 63 countries, opposed the MAI on the basis of its perceived impact on environmental laws. 93 These efforts were mirrored by many domestic environmental NGOs located in the OECD states, such as the Australian Conservation Foundation. 94 While environmental groups were particularly prominent, the campaign attracted a wide variety of other groups. An indicative typology would include domestic trade unions (eg the United Steelworkers of America), international human rights groups (eg Amnesty International), developmental bodies (eg Community Aid Abroad), 95 religious organisations (eg the Quakers), 96 churches (eg Uniting Church in Australia) 97 and nationalist political parties (eg the Australian One Nation party). 98 Most of these groups can be regarded as specific interest organisations. Yet the 'Stop MAI' campaign also involved groups opposing the broader processes of economic globalisation. In the US, Public Citizen (which claims membership of more than 150 000) used its Global Trade Watch division to oppose the MAI. 99 The broader mandate of Public Citizen is evident in its vow to work in defense of consumer health and safety, the environment, good jobs and democratic decision-making, which are being threatened by corporate-led globalization that includes so-called 'free trade' agreements such as the WTO and NAFTA. 100 A similar group which campaigned strongly against the MAI is the Council of Canadians, a 'citizens' watchdog' that claims membership of over 100 000 spread across 60 chapters in Canada. 101 The diversity and large numbers of NGOs involved in the campaign as well as the depth of their concern can be traced to three factors. First, the text released onto the Internet did not contain the list of confidential country-specific exceptions lodged by member states. Without these exceptions, the text implied that all sectors of a nation's economy would be open to unrestricted foreign investment. This was obviously not the case. As noted earlier, the exceptions lodged by member states such as Australia proved to be much more extensive than was expected. This mistaken perception was never forcefully countered by the OECD. As will be shown later, when the OECD eventually created its own MAI website in April 1998, it released the negotiating text with official commentary but little clear explanation of the top down structure of the agreement.
Secondly, the MAI negotiating text contained similar investor protection and dispute settlement provisions to those in Chapter 11 of NAFTA. In turn, the NAFTA provisions had been used by Ethyl Corporation in its (at that time) ongoing NAFTA action against Canada to challenge a ban on the import and transport of a petroleum additive. 102 The purpose of the ban was ostensibly environmental. In July 1998 (in the midst of the MAI negotiations), Canada agreed to settle the dispute, lift its ban and pay Ethyl Corporation US$13 million in compensation. 103 This led to the assumption by NGOs that the MAI provisions, if finalised, could be similarly used by foreign investors to challenge environmental or other regulatory measures that had the effect of lessening the value of actual or proposed investments. 104 Finally, NGOs used the Internet extensively in their campaign, both to coordinate their opposition and to disseminate information about the MAI. The effectiveness of the role of the Internet in the coordination of the 'Stop MAI' campaign will be considered next.
B
Structure of the Campaign: NGOs as 'Network Guerillas'?
The draft MAI negotiating text was first leaked onto the Internet in February 1997. 105 By March 1997 it became clear that MAI negotiators would not be able to meet the original deadline of May 1997. At the OECD Ministerial Meeting in May 1997, a new deadline to finish negotiations by May 1998 was agreed upon. Crucially, this decision provided NGOs opposed to the MAI time in which to organise their campaign against the agreement.
The Internet was the primary way in which NGOs organised the 'Stop MAI' campaign. As they were largely excluded from official communication channels with the OECD, NGOs began to disseminate information about the MAI amongst themselves. The leaked draft of the MAI was quickly picked up by most of the NGO websites opposing the MAI. Similarly, NGO critiques of the MAI were distributed through the 'Stop MAI' network. The use of the Internet to share information about the MAI is exemplified by a boast of a prominent anti-MAI campaigner:
'We are in constant contact with our allies in other countries', said Maude Barlow, the Council of Canadians' chairwoman. 'If a negotiator says something to someone over a glass of wine, we'll have it on the Internet within an hour, all over the world.' 106 The tools of the Internet -websites and email newsgroups -thus became the mechanism to link up a vast array of NGOs. There were an estimated 50 websites devoted to the MAI and 200 newsgroup postings. 107 An example of the way in which newsgroups coordinated the campaign is the Australian 'How to stop MAI' newsgroup. 108 That newsgroup contains details of protests against the MAI in various Australian states and territories, the preparation of media statements, the coverage of the MAI in the mainstream media, the results of a teleconference with NGOs in other countries, and even an outing of 'some of Australia's pro-MAIers'. 109 While it is clear that NGOs relied heavily on the Internet to structure their campaign against the MAI, the next logical step in the analysis should focus on how that technology affected the substantive accuracy of NGO claims about the MAI. The next part of the article will consider the substance of NGO claims against the MAI publicised on the Internet and compare those claims objectively to the analysis of the MAI provisions considered earlier. NGO opposition can be basically divided into two distinct themes. First, NGOs opposed the MAI as an instrument of economic globalisation. Under this rubric, many NGO claims stretched the ambit of MAI clauses to breaking point. But whilst largely inaccurate, these incendiary claims were never forcefully countered by the OECD, nor by the release of basic information about the MAI project. The second theme had much more substance and relied on the problematic similarities between the MAI provisions and NAFTA Chapter 11. With regard to this second theme, it is submitted that NGOs did indeed act as some form of 'intellectual competitors' with the OECD. The best evidence of this is the fact that the Chairperson of the MAI Negotiating Group released a package of changes late in negotiations to address these concerns. 110 
C
Substance of the Campaign: NGOs as Intellectual Competitors?
1
The MAI as an Instrument of Economic Globalisation
Much NGO opposition was not directed at the MAI specifically but reflected a more general anxiety about the effects of economic globalisation. 111 This anxiety appears to be based on underlying opposition to the pursuit of policies of economic liberalism.
As a starting point, some NGOs questioned the underlying rationale of the MAI by claiming that, unlike domestic participants, foreign investors do not assist the economies and communities of host states. 112 negotiations, the OECD never really countered this basic concern by illustrating the benefits that flow from foreign investment (and, by extension, the MAI, which would have liberalised restrictions on the entry and operation of FDI).
NGOs went even further to argue that the MAI was not only economically problematic but that it would provide investors with a degree of power that would impact adversely on the democratic processes of host states: this global investment treaty constitutes a power grab for transnational corporations that would end up hijacking the fundamental democratic rights and freedoms of peoples all over the world. 113 Clearly, this type of claim overstates the significance of the MAI. The primary aim of the MAI was to extend the non-discriminatory standards of treatment long established in bilateral investment treaties on a multilateral basis (albeit to the pre-establishment phase of the investment process). But again, this type of incendiary claim was never countered by a calm, clear and accessible illustration by the OECD of the MAI, its provisions and expected benefits.
More specifically, the MFN and national treatment clauses in the MAI were often misunderstood by prominent and influential NGOs. In 1998, Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke published a book attacking the MAI. 114 At that time, Barlow was chairperson of the Council of Canadians, which took a prominent role in opposing the MAI. 115 The publication makes the following claim about the operation of the MFN clause in the MAI:
Under the 'most favoured nation' clause, corporations based in the signatory countries (the twenty-nine OECD countries) are to be given preferential treatment with regard to their investments. 116 This claim is simply incorrect. The MFN obligation would require signatory countries to provide the same standard of treatment between investors of different, foreign countries. Of itself, the MFN clause would not provide any form of preferential treatment for foreign investors.
A distinction needs to be made between foreign and domestic investors based on the formation of capital. Implicitly, domestic investors participate in a social contract by staying in production, hiring local workers, paying taxes and retaining profits in the country. In doing so, they contribute to, as well as benefit from, the socialized value of capital. But foreign investors which suddenly appear on the scene have made no contribution to the build-up of social wealth in the host country. In many cases, foreign firms buying an existing domestic company intend to stay only a short time, yet want to be able to take full advantage of the stored social value of capital built-up by previous generations of labour. To some extent, the inaccuracies of NGO claims were shaped by the manner in which the negotiating text was leaked onto the Internet. It was released without details of the country-specific exceptions that could be lodged by contracting parties. This led to the mistaken perception that all national laws of contracting parties that discriminated against foreign investors would be eliminated by the MAI. In turn, NGOs presented their claims regarding the impact of the MAI on national sovereignty in particularly accessible and threatening ways. For example, the Western Governors' Association, an American advocacy NGO, prepared a report easily accessible on its Internet website detailing state-by-state specific laws that might be threatened if the US signed the MAI. 117 The same approach was taken by Friends of the Earth, which cited a variety of pro-environmental laws that it claimed would conflict with the MAI. 118 2
The MAI as a Facsimile of NAFTA Chapter 11
Aside from their broad concerns about economic globalisation, NGOs also used a more specific argument against the MAI: its facsimile of the NAFTA Chapter 11 model and likely impact on the regulatory autonomy of host states. NGOs focused particularly on the close similarity between the investment protection provisions of the NAFTA and the MAI. The settlement of the arbitral dispute brought by Ethyl Corporation against Canada under NAFTA Chapter 11 gave impetus to these claims. 119 The concern that the MAI (by replicating NAFTA article 1110-type protection against indirect expropriation) would inhibit normal regulatory measures underlined much of the specific NGO opposition to the MAI:
Perhaps the greatest environmental threat the MAI poses is that, under the investor-state dispute procedure, any new laws to protect the environment, wilderness, species or natural resource production could be considered a form of 'expropriation' and foreign investors would have the right to sue for compensation before an international tribunal made up of unelected trade bureaucrats. 120 NGO analyses of this point seem somewhat prophetic given the results and jurisprudence that have resulted from NAFTA Chapter 11 cases since Ethyl Corporation. 121 The NAFTA states have scrambled to try and find a solution to the large number of arbitral cases brought by investors under Chapter 11. Until prompted by the NGO campaign (and resulting public opposition), the MAI negotiators did little to consider these legitimate concerns about the broad and undefined coverage of the investment protection provisions. The NGO campaign on this substantive aspect reaped dividends late in the negotiations. On 9 March 1998 the Chairperson of the MAI Negotiating Group proposed changes to the draft MAI 'to achieve balance between MAI disciplines and other important areas of public policy of concern to MAI Parties and to avoid unintended consequences on normal regulatory practices'. 122 Despite the insightful analyses by NGOs on these issues, the OECD provided them with little opportunity to meet with negotiators and communicate their views. Indeed, the OECD management of the negotiating process was traditionally statist, characterised by low levels of transparency (or, in the alternative, high levels of secrecy) and limited opportunities for most NGOs to participate. This exclusionary approach seems to have assisted NGOs in raising public opposition to the MAI.
D
The OECD Response: Too Little Too Late
Transparency
The MAI negotiations were largely conducted in secret with few official documents being released to the public. However, when the OECD realised that the only available information about the MAI on the Internet was provided by hostile NGO sites, it was forced in 1998 to establish an official MAI website. 123 This was a significant response to the NGO campaign, especially as the most recent official draft of the negotiating text was placed on the MAI website. The website also included a variety of other materials, including the mandate for 121 negotiations, a UK report on the developmental implications of the MAI and various Ministerial statements about the MAI. 124 These core documents were important but generally require specialist knowledge of economics, investment flows and past treaty initiatives in order to appreciate fully their provisions and conclusions. There was no clear and unbiased explanation of the manner in which the non-discriminatory standards of MFN and national treatment would operate. Similarly, there was little emphasis in these official documents on the ability of member states to lodge countryspecific exceptions and exclude core components of domestic regulatory autonomy from the operation of the MAI. Thus these official documents were never a match for many of the colourful and apocalyptic NGO claims about corporate power and the erosion of democratic norms in host states.
The content of the official MAI website is symptomatic of the assumption by the OECD negotiators that the public automatically understands or accepts the benefits that result from a process of trade and investment liberalisation. For most of the negotiations, little attempt was made to counter the incendiary antiglobalisation claims made by NGOs against the MAI. This was a critical mistake. An open international economy entails both costs and benefits. Both need to be carefully and honestly illustrated in order to develop public support for a treaty such as the MAI. From the commencement of negotiations in 1995 right up to early 1998, the OECD did not even attempt to undertake such an exercise. It was only in April 1998, towards the end of negotiations, that the OECD released a study entitled Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation. 125 This report, which is primarily a statistical illustration of the benefits of economic globalisation, was immediately denounced by one the Council of Canadians as 'pathetic'. 126 But it is precisely this type of study that needs to be undertaken and distributed before the start of negotiations towards an agreement like the MAI. Despite the report's statistical emphasis, it is written in an accessible style that addresses many NGO concerns about the process of economic globalisation. For example, chapter 7 of the report sets out the rationale for international investment rules and analyses their impact on national sovereignty. 127 Unfortunately, this 1998 report was released far too late; it should have been distributed and available electronically before negotiations had even commenced in 1995. This type of report, coupled with a clear explanation of the operation of the MAI, would have provided an alternative voice to (and possibly pre-empted) the NGO scare tactics in portraying the MAI as a lightning rod for grievances about the process of economic globalisation. 124 Ibid. However, the website created in 1998 was a limited resource. Historically, the OECD has provided few opportunities for NGOs to become involved in its work. The MAI negotiations followed this precedent and were characterised by limited opportunities for NGO participation.
(a) Background
The Convention on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 128 gives the OECD discretion to establish participatory relations with NGOs to (a) address communications to non-member States or organisations; (b) establish and maintain relations with non-member States or organisations; and (c) invite non-member Governments or organisations to participate in activities of the Organisation. 129
Despite this broad discretion, the OECD has historically provided participatory opportunities only to certain types of NGOs. 130 In order to be consulted by the OECD, an international NGO must satisfy the OECD that it has the following attributes:
(a) … wide responsibilities in general economic matters or in a specific economic sector. International NGOs that meet these strict requirements have the right to discuss subjects of common interest with a Liaison Committee chaired by the SecretaryGeneral and to be consulted on particular OECD activities by relevant OECD officials or committees. 132 These NGOs are also given access to certain documents to which the public does not have access. 133 These rights do not, however, extend to the right to attend negotiation sessions. To date, the number of NGOs that have been granted consultative status with the OECD is very limited. This reflects the essentially state-centric view of the OECD. As the OECD sees itself as an intergovernmental body, its internal workings are viewed as being intentionally reserved for its member states. 134 136 Like the OECD, BIAC is based in Paris. The chairs of BIAC and of its various policy committees are normally executives of some of the largest corporate entities based in the OECD member states. 137 BIAC had long advocated a wider investment instrument within the OECD. In 1992 it expressed the view that such an agreement would constitute the OECD's single most effective contribution to improving global economic performance. 138 At the commencement of negotiations, BIAC assembled an 'experts group' of corporate legal staff. 139 Surprisingly, BIAC was provided with relatively limited access to negotiators and information about the negotiations. The normal process of consulting BIAC (and TUAC) was displaced by special arrangements for negotiating the MAI. 140 Even the draft text of the MAI had to be obtained through a member state in 1997 because the Negotiating Group refused BIAC access. 141 In contrast, TUAC was originally constituted in 1948 as the trade union advisory committee for the Marshall Plan. 142 Upon the creation of the OECD in 1962, TUAC continued to represent the views of trade unions to the new organisation. Much of TUAC's work has focused on building an acceptance of core labour standards within the OECD grouping. For example, it has advocated research and sponsored a conference designed to show that adherence to labour 135 
(c) Exclusion of 'Other' NGOs
For most of the negotiations, the broader set of NGOs had no real access to the MAI Negotiating Group. In December 1996 there was an informal meeting with some NGOs at the OECD. This was followed by a more comprehensive meeting on 27 October 1997, where members of the OECD Secretariat and Negotiating Group met with representatives of 27 NGOs. Prior to this meeting, the NGOs gathered for a strategy session to share information and establish networks. 144 Their demands included a suspension of negotiations until an assessment could be made of the social, environmental and developmental effects of the MAI. 145 This was an extremist position, particularly given the fact that the OECD had spent a full two years in negotiations towards the MAI. Not surprisingly, the OECD refused the demand for suspension of negotiations. This led to a walkout by the NGOs from the consultative session. 146 The NGOs apparently felt that it had not been a productive session as their objections had not been heeded. Their resulting frustration is expressed in the demand that the OECD stop 'talking publicly about its consultations with NGOs without also talking about the serious concerns raised in those consultations '. 147 This failed meeting represents a lost opportunity for NGOs. They had been given the opportunity (albeit relatively late in the negotiations) to offer constructive input into the MAI. Instead of engaging constructively with the OECD, the NGOs elected to walk away from this opportunity and focus their efforts on cultivating public opposition to the MAI.
The next section will examine two distinct outcomes of the NGO campaign. First, the campaign clearly influenced growing public opposition to the MAI throughout much of 1997 and 1998. Conversely, the NGO critique of the problematic similarities between the MAI and the NAFTA model also contributed to a constructive proposal by the Chairperson of the MAI Negotiating Group for changes to the MAI negotiating text. 143 [Vol 3
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Obstructive and Constructive Outcomes of the NGO Campaign
The extension of the deadline to finish MAI negotiations in 1997 also coincided with changes in government in Britain and France. The new Blair and Jospin governments of Britain and France, respectively, showed a greater willingness to heed the concerns of NGOs. 148 Towards the end of the MAI negotiations, a number of parliamentary and other reviews had been implemented by member states of the OECD in recognition of the growing NGO and public opposition to the MAI. The five prominent member states that instituted some form of governmental review of the MAI were Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain and the US.
The Australian NGO campaign commenced in December 1997 after an ABC radio documentary on the MAI. 149 A national 'Stop MAI' group, comprising separate state-based committees, was formed soon after. 150 The group did not operate from formal premises. Instead, it communicated and organised itself almost entirely through email. A central aim of the Australian campaign was to raise awareness amongst the Australian public of the MAI and its provisions. In late 1998 a petition was sent to the OECD. The petition was used as the basis for a newspaper advertisement coinciding with the October 1998 OECD Ministerial Meeting. 151 The major objective of the 'Stop MAI' group was to have the MAI reviewed by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties ('JSCT') of the Commonwealth Parliament. That objective was realised in March 1998 when both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Senate referred the MAI to the JSCT. 152 This was the first time that the JSCT had investigated a draft treaty. The JSCT inquiry into the MAI was a significant undertaking; it comprised five public hearings and entertained over 900 submissions. 153 Many of these submissions were prepared by peak advocacy NGOs. 154 Eighty six per cent of these submissions rejected the proposition that Australia should ratify the draft MAI. 155 The JSCT inquiry had not finalised its finding when the MAI negotiations ended in December 1998. Nonetheless, the JSCT considered the issues surrounding the MAI sufficiently important to complete its inquiry. The final report of the JSCT on the MAI was released in March 1999. In broad terms, the report criticised the choice of the OECD as a negotiating forum for the MAI but recommended that Australia be involved in any future negotiations towards an 'agreement for the regulation of international capital'. 156 A similar process had occurred earlier in Canada. The Canadian NGO campaign also primarily took the form of a public information campaign. Public education sessions were held in town hall meetings across the country. 157 In June 1997, in the midst of the national election campaign, a coalition of NGOs placed an advertisement attacking the MAI in the Globe and Mail national newspaper. 158 In December 1997 the Canadian campaign succeeded in having the MAI reviewed by a parliamentary committee. 159 Opposition in France began to increase in mid 1997 and culminated in public demonstrations and critical press reviews. 160 French NGOs focused on the threat that the MAI might represent to the freedom of French governments to safeguard national cultural interests. As late as October 1997 the French negotiators had described the MAI as 'a reasonable agreement'. 161 But extensive demonstrations advocating a cultural exemption took place in Paris in February 1998, forcing the French Government to reiterate its commitment to a cultural exemption to the MAI. 162 More drastic action soon followed. In May 1998 a special commission was appointed to inquire into the MAI and make recommendations concerning the next steps to be taken. The Lalumière Report was issued in October 1998 following extensive NGO consultation. 163 The adverse findings in that report led to France's withdrawal from the MAI negotiations on 14 October 1998. 164 After the election of the Blair Labour Government in 1997 there was a steady flow of questions in the UK House of Commons about the impact of the MAI. The Blair Government soon became a champion for the inclusion of core labour 155 and environmental standards in the draft treaty. 165 Parliamentary questions about the impact of the MAI were also raised in the context of British international developmental assistance. This led to a comprehensive report, commissioned by the UK Department for International Development, assessing the developmental implications of the MAI. 166 In the US, environmental and social justice NGOs such as Public Citizen took a lead role in opposing the MAI. With support from some members of the US House of Representatives, a one-day hearing was held in the House of Representatives in March 1998. In the broader political context, the Clinton Government failed to obtain 'fast track' negotiation authority for the MAI from the US legislative branch. 167 This defeat, combined with the onset of an election year, resulted in a loss of momentum towards the MAI by the US negotiators.
Conversely and somewhat ironically, aside from the clear link between the NGO campaign and growing public opposition to the MAI throughout 1997 and 1998, the NGO campaign also resulted in a more constructive outcome. NGO concern as to the breadth of the NAFTA-like investor protection provisions in the MAI contributed to the release in 1998 of the Chairperson's package on environmental and labour provisions. 168 The package contains a variety of different initiatives varying in degrees of strength and specificity. At one end of the spectrum, it proposed the inclusion of preambular references to international declarations on the environment and labour. But there were more substantive attempts to address some of the problems of replicating the NAFTA Chapter 11 model. For example, within the investment protection provisions, the package proposed an interpretative note to limit the ability of investors to challenge nondiscriminatory regulations as forms of creeping or indirect expropriation. 169 Unfortunately, the release of that package was far too late as it only preceded the French withdrawal from the MAI negotiations by seven months. 165 UK Department for International Development, The Development Implications of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1998) 51. 166 Ibid. 167 Under the US Constitution, the US Congress has ultimate authority over matters of foreign commerce. But, in the past, it has delegated that function to the executive branch during, for example, the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO negotiations and the NAFTA negotiations. See generally Graham, above n 45, 19. 168 OECD, Chairman's Note, above n 69. 169 The proposed interpretative note reads as follows: * Interpretative Note: Articles __ on General Treatment, and __ on Expropriation and Compensation, are intended to incorporate into the MAI existing international legal norms. The reference in Article IV.2.1 to expropriation or nationalisation and 'measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation' reflects the fact that international law requires compensation for an expropriatory taking without regard to the label applied to it, even if title to the property is not taken. It does not establish a new requirement that Parties pay compensation for losses which an investor or investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising and other normal activity in the public interest undertaken by governments. Nor would such normal and nondiscriminatory government activity contravene the standards in Article__ .1 (General Treatment). OECD, Chairman's Note, above n 69, 6 (emphasis added).
V CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the Internet has dramatically increased the effectiveness of advocacy NGOs and especially their capacity to influence public opinion. The ability to share information and coordinate activities across national borders was particularly evidenced in the NGO campaign against the MAI. Whilst the NGO campaign was but one factor that led to the cessation of negotiations, it proved remarkably effective in mobilising public opinion against the MAI.
However, the ability of NGOs to engender public opposition to the MAI was, to some degree, linked to the poor efforts of the OECD in releasing information about the MAI. Many of the general NGO critiques that overstated the breadth of operation of the MAI were based on a leaked negotiating text with little substantive guidance on key aspects of the agreement. Without a clear analysis from the OECD of both the text and the likely benefits to flow from increased foreign investment, NGOs were easily able to depict the MAI as a lightning rod for public fears of the perceived excesses of economic globalisation. It was only late in the negotiations that a belated effort was made by the OECD to address this concern. Yet, at the same time, there is clear evidence in this case study of the ability of NGOs to act as intellectual competitors to trade and investment fora. The NGO campaign also relied on the problematic similarities between the investment protection provisions in the MAI and those of NAFTA Chapter 11. The NAFTA states are still struggling to find a solution for the difficulties that have arisen due to the broad formulation of those provisions.
Thus the case study seems to confirm that the impact of the Internet gives some degree of support to both proponents and opponents of greater NGO access to trade and investment negotiations. However, on the whole, it is submitted that the case study pushes the debate slightly in favour of greater NGO access. The primary reason for this is the powerful fact that the Internet dramatically empowers NGOs to assist in the sensitive process of conferring (or opposing) public approval, and hence legitimacy for new agreements. As the work of bodies like the WTO now moves further beyond tariff reduction, the need to engender broader forms of public support is heightened.
However, the case study only deals with part of the problem. Clearly, the next question is how to provide for greater access or even participatory opportunities in negotiations for NGOs. A variety of suggestions have been put forward on this point within the academic literature on this subject. 170 It is beyond the scope of this article to address that question in detail. However, there is nothing in the case study to indicate that the legitimate concerns about the representativeness and accountability of NGOs are somehow overcome by the impact of the Internet. If anything, the Internet appears to exacerbate these problems. Thus it is submitted that there is no substantive justification for giving NGOs direct participatory opportunities at the negotiating table. That is properly the province of representative national governments. However, the case study does suggest a more modest step towards creating broader NGO (and public) access to these negotiations; namely, increasing the transparency of the negotiating process.
This could comprise two steps. First, the start of negotiations should be marked by a greater attempt to build public support for negotiations by explaining the rationale for, and expected benefits and costs to flow from, the planned agreement. This type of positive transparency might even go some way in preemptively addressing unjustified attacks by NGOs that seek an obstructive role in the negotiations. Secondly, greater attention should be given to derestricting and making public key documents involved in the negotiations. The question of which documents to make public and when is an inherently sensitive one. 171 However, it will be increasingly difficult for negotiating fora to resist releasing some information, particularly given growing public expectations of transparency (partly driven by the Internet). Moving on this path could possibly even enhance the ability of NGOs to act as intellectual competitors in negotiating fora. NGOs might then at least be forced to justify their critiques against a benchmark of accurate and authorised materials rather than, as in the MAI episode, using leaked and incomplete information about negotiations. 171 This was evidenced recently in discussions in the WTO on document derestriction. After four years of talks, WTO members recently agreed to loosen the rules on the public release of restricted papers. Where a delegation asks that a document produced by the WTO be derestricted, the waiting time for derestriction has been reduced from approximately eight months to six to eight weeks. This agreement represents a compromise between developed country members (who pushed for automatic derestriction as they post most of their own documents on their publicly-accessible websites) and some developing country members including India and Malaysia (who wanted to give their capitals time to review papers before circulation 
